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Introductory Remarks
There are few institutions linked to the exercise of public power in the economic
sphere that have stood the test of time for as long as central banks.1 Indeed their
origins can be traced back to the seventeenth century when in 1668 the Swedish
‘Bank of the Estates of the Realm’ the forerunner of todays Riksbank was estab-
lished by the Riksdag, at the dawn of two major armed conflicts with neighbouring
Denmark. Soon thereafter, in the midst of the Nine Year War between England and
France the Bank of England was established by an Act of Parliament.2 Other
European countries such as France and the German Reich would follow suit in
due course.3
Asserting that the role of central banks has changed in the course of their long
history is hardly original. These changes can be observed both with regard to their
main tasks, as well as their ownership and (corporate) institutional structure.
A number of central bank systems have emerged from private corporations
((joint-) stock companies) that were initially set up with the aim to raise capital
for the financing of wars thus acting as the quasi-banker of government, while at
the same time undertaking commercial banking.4 Eventually these banks would
become public corporations.5 Other banks were set up as public corporations from
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granted royal charter on 27 July 1694.
3The Banque de France was set up in 1800, whereas in the German Reich the Reichsbank, the
forerunner of the Bundesbank, was only established in 1875.
4Namely in Sweden, England and the Netherlands.
5Such as the Bank of England and De Nederlandse Bank.
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the start.6 The modification of the structure of the banks can be linked to the
evolution of their tasks. Initially often set up to functioning as commercial entities
they would eventually be charged with the issuing of currency and take on lender of
last resort functions. Central banks became responsible for the conduct of monetary
policy, albeit initially often subject to direct government supervision.
The principal role of central banks in the conduct of economic policy of a
country also explains to some extent the trend towards nationalization of these
institutions that can be observed namely in the first half of the twentieth century.
However, a considerable number of central banks, including most prominently the
Banks of the Federal Reserve System remain shareholder-owned.7 The legal bases
of central banks reflected this function essentially by defining and delimiting the
exercise of authority in line with what can be observed for other institutions that
exercise public power. The definition of monetary policy objectives and the insti-
tutional structure of the bank, including the relationship with government, became
central features of central bank legal bases. As the sole issuers of currency, certainly
from the second half of the last century central banks also had a role to play beyond
the national sphere mainly through foreign exchange rate operations and the
participation in different international organizations and fore, such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements and, more recently,
the G-8 and G-20 summits.
When reflecting on the changing role of central banks in the global economy
three interconnected developments can be observed, including globalization,
regionalization and the global financial crisis. The hypothesis at the outset is that
these developments which are to a considerable extent beyond the sphere of
influence of any one central bank or indeed national government can have a
decisive impact on the (constitutional) legal position of central banks and their
foremost task, as it is currently understood, that is the conduct of monetary policy.
This contribution offers a panoramic view of selected issues linked to the institu-
tional position and main monetary policy task(s) of central banks and thus does not
aim at an all inclusive legal and/or economic analysis of all tasks that are or odd to
be associated with central banking.
Globalization
In the context of economic developments globalization may refer to “. . . the
processes involved with the emergence of a global economy characterized not
only by the opening of markets and the rapid expansion of trade, but moreover
6Such as the Reichsbank, the forerunner of the German Bundesbank.
7The South African Reserve Bank may serve as an example of a shareholder-owned central bank
whose status has recently come under pressure. See Press release on the nationalization of the
South African Reserve Bank of 25 January 2010, available at http://www.reservebank.co.za (last
accessed 7 May 2010).
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also of the removal of financial market restrictions and free capital flow on a global
scale.”8 Capital flow takes on namely the shape of Foreign Direct Investment
leading “. . . to an internationalisation of production processes and new ways of
doing business as companies have established affiliates abroad both to gain access
to foreign markets and to reduce input costs.”9 Central banks face several chal-
lenges. Firstly, there is an increased pressure to bring national laws and practices
relating to macro-economic governance in line with internationally recognised
standards and best practice. Moreover the regional pooling of monetary policy
tasks has resulted in a reformulation of the missions of central banks.
Towards Global Standards and Practices
Ohler has pointed out rightly that “From a legal point of view, the existence of
internationally open markets is surprising insofar as there exist no relevant treaty
rules under international law imposing a general obligation on states to guarantee
free movement of capital”, pointing furthermore out that states “. . . unilaterally
opened their capital markets, mainly to attract direct investments but also in order to
benefit from other forms of international capital movements.”10 Along equal lines it
may be argued that there is no international legal obligation to introduce particular
institutional arrangements with regard to monetary policy. Nevertheless a remark-
able synchronization of law and practice can be witnessed with regard to monetary
policy. Somewhat pointed central banks can be characterised as being independent
and single minded.
The reason for this partially spontaneous harmonization is that capital can move
virtually free of restrictions and, given today’s technological advances, can be
relocated almost instantly. Failing to bring law and practice on macro-economic
governance in line with internationally recognised standards and best practice can
result in a loss of confidence of globally acting markets in the financial environment
of a country at the detriment in the medium-term also of the real economy. Global
competition arguably reveals systemic weaknesses also in the legal sphere. It may
thus not be surprising that in parallel to the globalization of financial markets also
the main contours of monetary policy and the institutions that are charged with its
conduct have become less distinct. In fact, a clear monetary policy objective geared
towards the combating of inflation has become the dominant feature of central
banks. On the institutional side, central bank independence and accountability have
8Amtenbrink/Lastra, Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies –
A Theoretical Framework, in: De Mulder (ed.), Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and
Security. How Relevant Is a Rational Approach?, 2008, p. 5 (5).
9Trichet, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalized Economy, Speech held on the occasion of the
13th Conference de Montre´al, 18 June 2007, p. 1.
10Ohler, International Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets After the Crisis, Working
Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 4, March 2009, p. 9.
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become two almost globally recognised standards of central bank governance and
indeed prerequisite for the credibility of a countries’ monetary policy.11 The
existence of this peer pressure to fall in line is verified by the fact that countries
lacking a credible monetary policy choose to unilaterally link their currency to that
of a country or region with a central bank system featuring such characteristics.12
The benefits resulting from a managed or fixed exchange rate regime (currency
pegging) are thought to outweigh the costs of losing monetary policy as an
(ineffective) tool of economic policy.13
Facilitating this process of de jure synchronization, central bank governance
issues, ranging from the legal foundations and accountability to operational issues,
are regularly discussed in international fora, such as the Central Bank Governance
Forum,14 the Central Bank Governance Network,15 and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). This has resulted in standard-setting, such as the 1999 IMF Code of
Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies. Rather than
to establish a model central bank law the Code defines legal principles and rules of
conduct covering responsibilities and objectives of central banks for monetary
policy; the openness of the process for formulating and reporting monetary policy
decisions, as well as the public availability of information on monetary policy;
accountability arrangements for central banks.16 While this Code is of a non-
binding nature, it does not only reflect the major legal characteristics of many
central banks today but has also been applied in drawing up new or modernising
existing central bank systems, not least as a result of advisory activities of the IMF,
such as in the case of the 2004 Central Bank of Iraq Law.17
11Amtenbrink, The Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance – Towards a Model Central Bank
Law or a Code of Good Governance?, in: International Monetary Fund, Current Developments in
Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4, 2005, pp. 101 et seq. (102 et seq.).
12Currency board arrangements can for example be observed in a number of countries both inside
and outside the EU, including Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo and Montenegro are
examples of countries which use the euro as a parallel currency without any formal monetary
agreements with the EU.
13In context of the Euro, see Amtenbrink, Bits of Economic and Monetary Union Everywhere, in:
Kochenov (ed.), On Bits of Europe Everywhere. Overseas Possessions of the EU Member States in
the Legal-Political Context of European Law, forthcoming.
14A selected group of central bank governors that exchange views on the design and operation of
central banks.
15Forum bringing together central bank governors to exchange views on issues of central bank
governance with the Bank for International Settlements.
16IMF, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies: Declaration
of Principles, 1999, available at http://www.imf.org (last accessed 7 May 2010). On the feasibility
of a model central bank law (blueprint) see Amtenbrink, The Three Pillars of Central Bank
Governance – Towards a Model Central Bank Law or a Code of Good Governance?, in: Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 4, 2005, pp.
101 et seq. (119 et seq.).
17Law of 6 March 2004, available at http://www.cbi.iq/ (last accessed 7 May 2010). The IMF was
heavily involved in the drawing-up of the new statute.
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Central Banks as Guardians of Price Stability
Generally speaking economic policy may be divided into fiscal policy and mone-
tary policy. The latter is generally vested in the central bank of a country which
regulates the money supply, as well as the availability (liquidity) and cost of
money18 (interest rates) namely through open market operations (mainly refinan-
cing operations), standing facilities (overnight lending and deposit facilities) and
minimum reserve requirements for financial institutions.19
In pursuing monetary policy central banks are bound by the objectives which
their legal bases set. Such objectives may in principle refer to a whole range of
developments including inflation, employment and economic growth. A trend can
be observed towards the establishment of a singular monetary objective geared
towards price stability. With regard to the latter, the insights into what monetary
policy can and more importantly cannot achieve has developed towards the main-
stream conviction that the long-term impact of monetary policy on the real econ-
omy and namely growth and employment is limited (the so-called neutrality of
money),20 whereas at the same time a low rate of inflation forms the basis for and
has a favourable effect on real growth and employment.21 This is reflected in many
modern central bank legal bases which identify price stability as the primary
monetary policy objective.
This is not to say however that price stability is in all instances the only or indeed
primary monetary objective with which central banks are entrusted. While there has
been a clear trend towards giving priority to the combat of inflation,22 some central
bank legal bases still include multiple objectives. In the case of the European
Central Bank (ECB), Art. 127(1) TFEU clearly states that the primary objective
of the Bank is to maintain price stability. While the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) is also supposed to support the general economic policies in the
Union, this is limited by the fact that such activities may not compromise the
primary objective of the ECB. In cases where legal bases do introduce multiple
objectives in practice some central banks nevertheless orient their monetary policy
towards price stability. The Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway may serve as
an example in this regard. Monetary policy is supposed to be geared towards the
18A broad concept of money is referred to here which does not only include banknotes and coins but
also other means of payment, see Mitlid/Vesterlund, Steering interest rates in monetary policy –
how does it work, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review (2001) 1, p. 19.
19As this contribution focuses on the monetary policy objective itself, policy instruments are not
discussed here.
20See e.g. European Central Bank, The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2004, pp. 41–42.
21See e.g. Issing, Why Price Stability?, Paper presented at the First ECB Central Banking
Conference on 2 and 3 November 2000, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May
2010), with further references to relevant economic literature.
22Another example for a major central bank with a single monetary policy objective of price
stability is the Bank of Japan. See Art. 2 of the Bank of Japan Act (Act No. 89 of 18 June 1997).
The English language version is available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/ (last accessed 7 May 2010).
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stability of the Norwegian krone’s national and international value and, at the same
time, must underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output
and employment. The Norges Bank has translated this into an operational target
geared towards low and stable inflation.23 Somewhat in contrast to this approach,
based on indistinct and multiply statutory monetary objectives, the Federal Reserve
System (FED) and namely its Board of Governors and Federal Open Market
Committee conducts a monetary policy that promotes the achievement of the
statutory objectives of stable prices and maximum employment.24
As to the quantification of the monetary policy objective of central banks and
thus the degree to which and by whom the primary task of the central bank is
demarcated, different arrangements can be observed. Regularly the legal basis of a
central bank will not define the monetary objective namely through a quantification
of the price stability criterion. Highlighting this point, neither the Statute of the
ESCB and of the ECB nor the Federal Reserve Act include any details in this
regard.25 At the same time, the degree to which central banks are free in defining
price stability varies. Some legal bases foresee in a procedure for the establishment
of policy targets unilaterally by government, such as in the case at the Bank of
England,26 or by means of an agreement between government and the central bank,
such as for example at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.27 In other instances, most
notably the ECB and the FED, it is effectively left to the central bank itself to
quantify the monetary policy objective(s). Leaving aside the question whether from
the point of view of accountability a central bank should indeed be in charge of
setting its own goal(s),28 there is a notable consistency in the approach by central
23See paragraph 1 of the Regulation on Monetary Policy established by Royal Decree of 29 March
2001 pursuant to section 2, third paragraph, and section 4, second paragraph, of the Act of 24 May
1985 no. 28 on Norges Bank and the Monetary System.
24See section 2A(1) of the Federal Reserve Act: “The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary
and credit aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase production,
so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates.” Also see the goals of the FED as defined in the Board of Governor’s Planning
Document 2008–2011, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (last accessed 7 May 2010).
With regard to the approach to monetary policy in practice see Federal Reserve Bank San
Francisco, A Primer on Monetary Policy Part I: Goals and Instruments, FRBSF Weekly Letter,
Number 94-27, 5 August 1994.
25With regard to the ECB see Art. 127(1) TFEU. With regard to the FED see memorandum
submitted by the United States Federal Reserve System, in Treasury and Civil Service Committee,
The Role of the Bank of England, House of Commons Paper. Session 1993–94; 98-I vol. 2),
Report, together with the proceedings of the Committee, HC Session 1993–94 (HMSO, London
1993), app. 20.
26See section 12(1) of the Bank of England Act 1998. In practice the Chancellor of the Exchequer
sets an inflation target to be pursued by the Bank.
27See section 9 Reserve Bank Act 1989 based on which government and the governor of the Bank
have to establish a so-called Policy Target Agreement (PTA).
28On this issue see Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, 1999, chapter 5
I.1.1.
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banks to the setting of inflation targets.29 Thus for example the ECB aims at keeping
an inflation rate of below, but close to 2% over the medium term, the most recent
inflation target of the Bank of England is set at 2%, the Norge Bank targets a
consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5% over time, and the latest Policy
Target Agreement applicable to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand sets an inflation
rate between 1% and 3% on average over the medium term. Despite multiply and
non-hierarchical monetary policy objectives even FED officials in the past signalled
towards a rate in the region of 3%.30
Central Bank Independence and Accountability
Similar to the price stability objective, central bank independence has become an
important pillar of central bank governance that has found its way in many central
bank legal bases and thus characterises many central bank systems. Based on
insights from political economy in the last decades there has been a remarkable
trend towards the removal of monetary policy from the political business cycle by
positioning central banks outside the trias politica.31
This trend is closely linked to the attainable aims of monetary policy described
in the previous section. Indeed, it has been observed that there is a link between the
institutional structure of a central bank and namely its degree of independence and
the extent to which it can pursue monetary policy effectively, as “. . . an indepen-
dent central bank can give full priority to low levels of inflation, whereas in
countries with a more dependent central bank other considerations (notably re-
election perspectives of politicians and a low level of unemployment) may interfere
with the objective of price stability.”32 Monetary temptations by politicians can
stand in the way of an inflation-adverse monetary policy and long-term stability.
29In defends of the ECB’s approach in this regard this was already noted by Duisenberg, The
ECB’s quantitative definition of price stability and its comparison with such definitions or inflation
targets applied in other large economic areas, Letter to the Chairperson of the Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mrs. Christa Randzio-Plath, available at http://www.ecb.int (last
accessed 7 May 2010).
30Greenspan, Opening Remarks to the symposium “Achieving Price Stability”, sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 29–31 August 1996, pp. 1–5, available at http://www.kc.frb.
org (last accessed 7 May 2010).
31For a recent study with further references to economic literature see Crowe/Meade, Central Bank
Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness, IMF Working Paper WP/08/119.
32De Haan/Amtenbrink/Eijffinger, Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications,
BNL Quarterly Review, no. 209 – June 1999, pp. 169 et seq. (169–170), with reference to
Cuckierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence, 1992. For a more recent
study, see Alpanda and Honing, Political Monetary Cycles and a de facto Ranking of Central
Bank Independence, SSRN Working Paper June 2009, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1032084 (last accessed 7 May 2010).
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A monetary policy directed towards low levels of inflation is considered to be more
credible. This in return will enhance the effectiveness of the policy conducted by
the central bank. Indeed, ample evidence has been provided in economic writing for
a negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation and infla-
tion variability.33 Similar arguments are also applied to financial regulatory and
supervisory authorities, as the distance of the latter from government and elected
politicians is considered a precondition for the effective conduct of its task, namely
banking supervision.34 These insights have translated into the character of the legal
bases of central banks which define the position of the monetary policy authority
outside government namely by establishing own legal personality, the freedom to
pursue statutorily prescribed objectives and to apply the available instruments more
or less insulated from government or parliamentary interventions and by establish
the financing of the central bank through own resources.35 Moreover, this also
includes the exclusion or limitation of central bank credit to government.36
While in most instances central bank legal bases have the status of an ordinary
law (act of parliament), in the case of the European System of Central Banks this
feature has been elevated to a quasi-constitutional status, as the TFEU ensures the
independence not only of the European Central Bank (ECB), but also of the
participating national central banks in the conduct of the tasks assigned to them
in the ESCB.37 Vesting monetary policy and thus, an important part of economic
policy outside government and with it the constitutional system of checks and
balances applicable thereto has raised concerns about the accountability of central
banks for the tasks that have been assigned to them, and namely the pursue of the
monetary policy objectives.38 Indeed, a central bank that continuously pursues a
monetary policy which lacks broad political support but also the support of the
public at large is likely to be overridden sooner or later.39 Conversely, a broad
public support can help to shield a central bank from political pressure. As a
33See Eijffinger/De Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence, Princeton
University Special Papers in International Economics, No. 19, May 1996, with further references.
34See e.g. Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors, Principles for Effective Banking Supervision,
September 1997, List of core principles for effective banking supervision, para. 1.
35Different elements refer to the institutional, functional, organizational and financial indepen-
dence of a central bank.
36See e.g. Cottarelli, Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government. Theory and Practice, IMF
Occasional Paper No. 110, December 1993, pp. 3 et seq. In the context of the ESCB see Art.
123–124 TFEU.
37Art. 130–131 TFEU and the Protocol on the ESCB and of the ECB annexed to EU Treaty and
TFEU; see also Art. 88 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which makes the transfer of
monetary policy competences subject to the existence of a ECB that is independent and moreover
geared towards maintaining price stability.
38See e.g. Gormley/De Haan, The Democratic deficit of the European Central Bank, ELRev. 21
(1996), p. 95; Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, 1999, with further
references.
39De Haan/Amtenbrink/Eijffinger, Accountability of Central Banks: Aspects and Quantifications,
BNL Quarterly Review, no. 209, June 1999, pp. 169 et seq. (171).
26 F. Amtenbrink
counterweight to the independent position of central banks, in the last two decades
drafters of central bank legislation have become more alert to introduce channels
through which the central bank is answerable for its conduct. In general, mechan-
isms providing those charged with judging the performance of the bank with the
necessary means to make an informed assessment and tools to penalize central bank
behaviour can be differentiated. In judging the performance of a central bank first
and foremost its primary monetary policy objective must be defined as precisely as
possible. The trend described in the previous section to identify price stability as an
overriding objective in many central bank laws has facilitated the accountability of
central banks. At the same time considerable differences exist with regard to the
extent to which and by whom the objective is actually quantified. Central bank legal
bases regularly impose specific information obligation and thus, transparency
requirements. The purpose of these requirements at least in practice is twofold, as
they may not only serve the accountability, but also the credibility of the central
bank.40
At the same time, central bank laws and namely those that provide for a large
degree of independence often do not include elaborate provisions linked to penaliz-
ing central bank action. This is hardly surprising given the potential trade-off
between independence and arrangements such as overriding mechanism allowing
for monetary policy decisions to be (temporarily) set aside and the possibility for a
performance-based dismissal of central bank officials. To be sure this is not to say
that there is no room for such arrangements, as the example of internationally
recognized central bank systems, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Bank of England, highlight.41
Regionalization
An important factor contributing to the unification of the position and tasks of
central banks certainly in the European context has been regionalization. Despite
several examples of regional cooperation of countries in the economic sphere, such
as inter alia the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Common Market of the South
(MERCOSUR),42 undoubtedly the European Union (EU) is the most far-reaching
40Dincer/Eichengreen, Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why and With What Effects?, NBER
Paper No. 13003, March 2007; De Haan/Amtenbrink/Waller, The Transparency and Credibility of
the European Central Bank, JCMS 42 (2004) 4, p. 775, with further references.
41The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 introduces both an override mechanism and
performance-based dismissal of the governor of the Bank. The possibility to override monetary
policy decisions can also be found at the Bank of England under the Treasury’s reserve powers, see
section 19 of the Bank of England Act 1998.
42See e.g. Hochreiter/Schmidt-Hebbel/Winckler, Monetary Union: European Lessons, Latin
American Prospects, The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 13 (2002) 3, p. 297.
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form of regional integration, not least because it also stands for an advanced, albeit
far from optimal, system of macroeconomic coordination and monetary policy
integration.
Other monetary cooperations are of a geographically and economically limited
nature, namely the Union e´conomique et mone´taire ouest-africaine (UEMOA)43
with the Banque centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) being
entrusted with the conduct of monetary policy of Benin, Burkina Faso, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Se´ne´gal and Togo, and the Communaute´
e´conomique et mone´taire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)44 with the Banque des
Etats de l’Afrique centrale (BEAC) being in charge of monetary policy for Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
Both common currencies, that is the UEMOA Western African CFA franc and the
CEMAC Central African CFA franc are convertible through a fixed parity initially
with the French franc (now the Euro) based on bilateral agreements.45
In contrast, the EU stands for an unprecedented degree not only of legal and
economic, but also political and social integration of countries and their citizens.
The 1957 Treaty establishing a European Economic Community (EEC Treaty)
did not only lay the foundations for the free movement of financial services, the
freedom of establishment of financial institutions in all Member States and the free
movement of capital,46 but also already provided the basic rationale for the abolishing
of barriers to trade arising from the utilization of each Member State of their
own currency.47 It may thus be little surprising that already in 1970 plans where
pursued in the then European Communities to establish a Community system of
central banks and to irrevocably fix the exchange rates of the currencies of the
Member States.48 Ironically, these plans for the establishment of a European
economic and monetary union in stages became victim of the global economic
43Treaty establishing the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) signed on 12 May 1962 (as
amended), namely Title V.
44Traite´ du 16 mars 1994 instituant la Communaute´ Economique et Mone´taire de l’Afrique
Centrale.
45On the efforts of the UEMOA and CEMAC to promote the convergence of economic policies see
Strauss-Kahn, Regional Currency Areas: A Few Lessons from the Experiences of the Eurosystem
and the CFA Franc Zone, BIS Papers No. 17, supra n. 51, pp. 43–58 (p. 51).
46To be sure, free movement of capital was only fully liberalized in primary European law with the
coming into effect of the new provisions on capital in the Treaty on the European Union. Prior to
that restrictions on movements of capital had already been abolished by secondary Community
law, see Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, OJ 1988 L 178/5, and namely the nomenclature in its Annex 1.
47Inter alia in the shape of exchange rate risks and a lack of price transparency in the internal
market.
48Report to the Council and Commission on the Realisation by Stages of Economic and Monetary
Union in the Community of 8 October 1970, OJ 1970 C 136/1. This document has become better
known as the Werner Report.
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crisis and the collapse of the first and until the present day only global exchange rate
system under the Bretton-Woods Agreement, the so-called Gold Standard,49 leaving
theMember States without any effective coordination of their exchange rates until the
establishment of the European Monetary System.
The provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) introduced by 1993
Treaty on European Union highlight how the role of national central banks can
change in the process of the pooling of competencies for monetary policy in a single
institutional framework and the replacement of the national currencies by a single
common currency. It would be an oversimplification to describe this process as one
of centralization of monetary policy. Instead an institutional system has been put in
place which, as far as its decision-making structure is concerned, shares some
characteristics of federal central bank systems, such as the German Bundesbank
and the FED.50 While monetary policy decisions are no longer taken at the national
central banks, their governors – for the time being – all participate in the decision-
making in the Governing Council, the decision-making body of the ECB.51 Due to
this involvement of the national central bank governors in the decision-making of
the independent ECB, primary Union law extends the independence requirement
also to the national central banks of the Member States. Resulting from this, in the
run-up to EMU, several central bank laws of the Member States where amended to
bring them in line with the provisions of the then EC Treaty (now TFEU) and the
Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB.
As a consequence of the pooling of competences in the area of monetary policy
the central banks of the euro area Member States were effectively stripped of their
primary task and – at least in some instances – also their dominant position in the
national system of economic governance.52 In seeking new areas of activities, not
least in order to limit cuts – central banks have taken on new or expanded on
existing tasks not linked to those exercised in the framework of the ESCB.
In particular with regard to financial markets and namely financial institutions
central banks can be seen to fulfil prudential supervisory tasks either on their own
or jointly with other national agencies.
49See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund of 2 July 1944, as amended.
50It is a well-known fact that namely the Bundesbank-system has been a major source of inspira-
tion for the drafters of the legal framework governing the ESCB and the ECB.
51Note that according to Art. 10(2) of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB a voting system on a
rotation basis is introduced from the time that the number of national central bank governors
present in the Governing Council exceeds 15. The introduction of this system has been postponed
until the number of national central bank governors exceeds 18. See Decision of the ECB of 18
December 2008 to postpone the start of the rotation system in the Governing Council of the
European Central Bank, ECB/2008/29, OJ 2009 L 3/4.
52In the case of Germany it is fair to extent this previous position to Europe as a whole, see Marsh,
The Bundesbank. The Bank that Rules Europe, 1993.
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What is more, the establishment of a European regional currency unit has
become a model for initiatives in the same direction elsewhere. Thus for example
the participating countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council, including Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have announced
plans to launch a single currency.53
Global Challenges to Central Banking
In the economic and monetary sphere fiscal and monetary policy authorities find
themselves faced with developments which are not only outside their sphere of
influence, but at times also difficult to anticipate. While the global financial crisis
may be considered the prime example in this regard, the same also holds true under
normal conditions in the global economy.
The Globalization of Monetary Policy
The challenges which central banks face in the light of globalization and also
regionalization are not only of an institutional nature, but also concern the monetary
policy tasks they perform. More concrete, central banks are faced with economic
developments outside their sphere of influence. It has been highlighted that globali-
zation increases uncertainty for monetary policy and evidence has been provided to
the effect that central banks have become less effective in influencing national
liquidity conditions.54 Whether and to what extent central banks should pursue a
monetary policy that is more geared towards taking into account possible spill-over
effects as a result of global financial markets is arguably not primarily a legal
question in the sense that this does not require an adjustment of the legal basis of a
central bank, but rather of the monetary policy strategy pursued by the central bank.
Given their independent position, this is primarily for the central bank itself to
decide upon.
However, does globalization have an influence on the central bank in pursuing
its primary/main monetary policy objective in the first place? With the opening of
markets global developments namely linked to the trade in goods and services have
an impact on the development of prices. Both positive and negative effects can be
53See Sturm and Siegfried, Regional Monetary Integration in the Member States of the Gulf
Cooperation Council, ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 31, June 2005; see also Malliaris, The
Global Monetary System: Its Weaknesses and the Role of the IMF, the EU and NAFTA, North
American Journal of Economics and Finance 13 (2002), pp. 72 et seq.
54See e.g. the study by Belke/Rees, The Importance of Global Shocks for National Policy Makers.
Rising Challenges for Central Banks, Ruhr Economic Papers No. 135, September 2009, who
identify global liquidity as an important factor.
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linked to this globalization of inflation.55 On the one hand, globalization is consid-
ered to have had a positive effect on inflation in industrial countries by inducing
downward pressure on prices inter alia through the opening of labour markets,
better allocation of (financial) resources and increased competition.56 However,
highlighting the complexity of the effects of the processes involved, globalization
may also induce upward pressure on prices as demand namely for energy and raw
materials in emerging economies has grown notably. Whether and to what extent a
positive correlation between globalization and inflation exists in the long-run
remains subject of debates. Summarizing the scepticism raised against the globali-
zation-of-inflation argument Ball argues: “In my view, there is little reason to think
that globalization has influenced inflation significantly. “Modest” and “limited”
probably overstate the effects.”57
Trichet has observed that “Whatever the influences being exerted in the context
of globalisation, the basic principle which allows the anchoring of monetary policy
remains: in the long run, inflation is a monetary phenomenon. As a consequence,
globalisation does not affect the central role and overriding responsibility of central
banks to preserve price stability”58 However, even if this is true, it should not be
mistaken for an argument that globalization cannot have an impact on the policy
stands of a central bank. While in the absence of exchange rate arrangements
central banks continue to decide themselves on the rate of inflation of their
currency,59 in determining their approach to monetary policy and thus their strategy
monetary policy authorities do need to take into account the “global factors [that]
drive inflation” and thus the external factors that put pressure on prices.60 What is
more, the aftermath of the global financial crisis highlights that external and
55Generally see International Monetary Fund, Globalization and Inflation, World Economic
Outlook, April 2006.
56See e.g. Rogoff, Impact of Globalization on Monetary Policy, Paper prepared for the symposium
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 2006, available at http://www.kc.
frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2006/pdf/rogoff.paper.0829.pdf (last accessed 7 May 2010), pp. 6
et seq; but see Trichet, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalized Economy, Speech held on the
occasion of the 13th Conference de Montre´al, 18 June 2007, p. 4, who also refers to other
contributing factors not directly linked to globalization, such as budgetary discipline and the
anti-inflationary approach to monetary policy.
57Ball, Has Globalization Changed Inflation, NBER Working Paper No. 12687, November 2006,
p. 1
58Trichet, The Role of Central Banks in a Globalized Economy, Speech held on the occasion of the
13th Conference de Montre´al, 18 June 2007.
59A point made by Kohn, The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and Their Implications for
Monetary Policy, Speech held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 51st Economic Confer-
ence, 16 June 2006, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (accessed 7 May 2010).
60Brackets added. Rogoff, Impact of Globalization on Monetary Policy, Paper prepared for the
symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 2006, available at
http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2006/pdf/rogoff.paper.0829.pdf (last accessed 7
May 2010), p. 8; Ball, Has Globalization Changed Inflation, NBER Working Paper No. 12687,
November 2006, p. 3, argues that financial openness as defined by the ratio of foreign assets and
liabilities have an impact on interest rates and asset prices.
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asymmetric shocks can compel central banks to act in the face of a narrowly defined
monetary policy objective.
In fulfilling their tasks in a globalized economy the margin of error for central
banks are smaller than has previously been the case. Much more so than by any
formal mechanisms of accountability vis-a`-vis government and/or parliament,
central banks are judged by their actions. Kohn observes in this context that “. . .
integrated financial markets can exert powerful feedback, which may be less
forgiving of any perceived policy error”.61 The author highlights this point with
reference to the FED: “For example, if financial market participants thought that the
FOMC was not dedicated to maintaining long-run price stability- a notion that I can
assure you is not correct- they would be less willing to hold dollar-denominated
assets, and the resulting decline in the dollar would tend to add to inflationary
pressures.”62
While there are currently no concrete plans in this direction, the global financial
openness and the risks of spill-over and domino effects linked thereto does raises
the question whether new, reinforced forms of transnational economic and mone-
tary governance are required.63 This has accumulated in calls for the establishment
of a global monetary authority.64 Such far-reaching proposals may be a long way
off, to say the least. Yet the above mentioned trend towards the regional pooling of
monetary policy could, if continued, facilitate the rebirth of a global exchange rate
mechanism to facilitate stability.
By pooling monetary policy as in the case of the ESCB and the ECB, an
additional challenge arise if the transfer of competences with regard to monetary
policy is not accompanied by a transfer of equal competences for the conduct of a
common economic policy. In the EU economic policies remain to a large extent a
domain of the Member States. This poses special challenges for the ECB in
formulating and implementing monetary policy in the euro area. From the start it
could be observed that economic developments of the euro area Member States
were anything but homogenous, raising the question whether the EU or at least the
euro area actually constitutes an optimal currency area.65 While the success of
61Kohn, The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and Their Implications for Monetary Policy,
Speech held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 51st Economic Conference, 16 June 2006,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (last accessed 7 May 2010).
62Kohn, The Effects of Globalization on Inflation and Their Implications for Monetary Policy,
Speech held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s 51st Economic Conference, 16 June 2006,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (last accessed 7 May 2010).
63See e.g. the study by Belke/Rees, The Importance of Global Shocks for National Policy Makers.
Rising Challenges for Central Banks, Ruhr Economic Papers No. 135, September 2009.
64See e.g. Garten, Global authority can fill financial vacuum, Financial Times Online edition,
published on 25 September 2008, available at http://www.ft.com (last accessed 7 May 2010);
Calvo, Lender of last resort: Put it on the agenda!, VoxEU.org Policy Note, 23 March 2009,
available at http://www.voxeu.org (last accessed 7 May 2010).
65Issing, One size fits all! A single monetary policy for the Euro Area, Speech held at the
International Research Forum, 20May 2005; Amtenbrink, Economic, Monetary and Social Policy,
in: McDonnell/Kapteyn/Mortelmans/Timmermans (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the
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monetary policy in such an asymmetric system of economic governance depends
not in the least on strong legal mechanisms to ensure fiscal discipline of the
participating Member States, the near de facto insolvency of the euro area Member
State Greece highlights the severe shortcomings of the present system of economic
coordination in the EU and the danger this poses for a unified monetary policy.
The Global Economic Crisis
The global financial crisis has highlighted the consequences and knock-on effects
that the collapse of large financial institutions can have not only on the financial
system but also on the real economy. While central banks arguably played a role
both in the making of and dealing with this crisis of global proportions, it is
arguably the former which has attracted the attention of legislators and policy
makers the most, resulting in the re-assessment of the role of central banks.66
In analysing the causes of the global financial crisis the European Commission
mandated 2009 Larosie`re Report identifies several causes including inter alia: the
illusion that permanent and sustainable high level of growth are sustainable;
fundamental failures in the evaluation of risk and the role that Credit Rating
Agencies play with regard to the assessment of credit risk; a failure of corporate
governance; a failure of the regulatory and supervisory system as well as of the
crisis management.67 In this context also the role of central bank has been criticised
for having contributed to ‘benign macroeconomic conditions’ through low interest
rates which, combined with low inflation rates have resulted in a rapid growth of the
volume of credit. Namely the role of the Fed has been questioned for its omission to
tighten its monetary policy stands, thereby meeting excess liquidity namely in the
shape of rapidly rising asset prices. In the view of experts this has contributed to the
European Communities, (4th ed.) 2008, pp. 881 et seq. (966), on early signs of diverging economic
situations in the euro area.
66With regard to the role of central banks in dealing with the crisis that is not explored in this
contribution, see e.g. Bank for International Settlements Committee on the Global Financial
System, Central bank operations in response to the financial turmoil, Report submitted by a
Study Group established by the Committee, July 2008, available at http://www.bis.org (last
accessed 7 May 2010); Papademos, How to deal with the global financial crisis and promote the
economy’s recovery and sustained growth, Speech held at the 7th European Business Summit
organised by the European Business Forum, 26 March 2009, available at http://www.ecb.int (last
accessed 7 May 2010); Roth, Challenges for Central Banks during the Current Global Crisis,
address at the occasion of the Sixth Annual NBP-SNB Joint Seminar on “Challenges for Central
Banks during the Current Global Crisis”, 15 June 2009, available at http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/
reference/sem_2009_06_14_speech/source (last accessed 7 May 2010).
67The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosie`re Report), chaired by J. de
Larosie`re, 25 February 2009, p. 7 et seq. To be sure, the policy recommendations made in this
report are not all limited to the EU.
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housing bubble that is linked to the subprime mortgage crisis.68 The credibility of
central banks has suffered as a result of this. Indeed, central banks have been
diagnosed with a “doctrinal blindness”,69 and the rationale of the focus in many
central bank systems on price stability is questioned. The objectives of central
banks are considered to be insufficiently geared towards detecting and addressing
system risks.70 To be sure, the primarily economic debate on the contribution of
central banks to the global financial crisis is far from conclusive. Nevertheless it
seems appropriate to raise the issue of possible legal consequences for the future
position and tasks of central banks and namely, whether and to what extent the
monetary policy objective should be geared towards or include aims other than
price stability, and to what extent central banks should play a more active role in
(macro-) prudential supervision.71
Central banks may find themselves faced with demands for the inclusion in their
legal bases of new or the extension of existing objectives and tasks linked to
prudential supervision. As the separation of the monetary policy from the financial
regulatory and supervisory tasks are believed to have contributed to a one-sided
focus on inflation,72 a more prominent role for central banks in monitoring systemic
risks is suggested. Thus for example the Larosie`re Report recommends that central
banks “. . . should receive an explicit formal mandate to assess high-level macro-
financial risks to the system and to issue warnings where required.”73 From a legal
68The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosie`re Report), chaired by J. de
Larosie`re, 25 February 2009, p. 7; for a brief assessment of the contribution of the U.S. subprime
mortgages market to the financial crisis see Ohler, International Regulation and Supervision of
Financial Markets after the Crisis, Working Papers on Global Financial Markets No. 4, March
2009, pp. 5 et seq; see also the remarks by the Governor of the Bank of Japan: Shirakawa,
Revisiting the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy, Speech at the Economic Club of New
York, 22 April 2010, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en (last accessed 24 April 2010), p. 5, who
openly wonders: “For me, the key question, which applies to many central banks including both
the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve, is that, why we, as central banks, maintained interest
rates at such a low level, in spite of the uneasiness we felt at that time toward the bubble-like
symptoms.”
69Roberts, The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis, Suffolk
University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 09-54, 21 December
2009, p. 17, who observes that “Central bank independence was not justified as a technique for
protecting systemic stability”, but rather, “an anti-inflation regime”.
70See e.g. Frisell/Roszbach/Spagnolo, Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central
Banks, Sveriges Riksbank Research Paper Series No. 54, March 2008, p. 8; Shirakawa, Revisiting
the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy, Speech at the Economic Club of New York, 22 April
2010, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en (last accessed 24 April 2010), pp. 7–8.
71On the terminology see Clement, The term “macro prudential”: origins and evolution, BIS
Quarterly Review, March 2010, p. 59.
72Shirakawa, Revisiting the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy, Speech at the Economic Club
of New York, 22 April 2010, available at http://www.boj.or.jp/en (last accessed 7 May 2010),
pp. 5–6.
73The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosie`re Report), chaired by
J. de Larosie`re, 25 February 2009, p. 44.
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point of view it takes little to include financial stability as another central bank
(monetary) objective in particular since many central bank laws in principle already
recognise a role of the central bank in monitoring developments in this regard.74
However, objections are the feasibility of assigning a system stability objective to
central banks and the effects which the taking on of supervisory tasks may have on
the independence of monetary policy (operations).
Including a system stability objective in the legal basis of a central bank raises
the question exactly what the position of such an additional mandate should be next
to the existing primary objective currently found in many central bank laws. Should
it be given priority, placed on an equal footing with price stability or come as a
secondary objective? As has been observed above multiple central bank objectives
may not only be problematic from the point of view of accountability, but come at
the expanse of the effective conduct of any price stability objective. The latter of
course assumes the existence of a trade-off between price stability and a system
stability objective. This is however far from undisputed. Calling for the inclusion of
an explicit system stability objective also suggested that the price stability objective
is not sufficient in this regard. However, Issing has argued that “. . . if the central
bank employs a medium term horizon for the definition of price stability and
implies a strategy encompassing a stability-oriented, forward-looking approach,
financial imbalances will implicitly obtain the attention they deserve. This is true
even if financial stability is not considered a general objective of the central bank
and monetary policy aims at maintaining the objective of price stability. [. . .]
In most cases price stability would foster financial stability”.75 Supporting this
view past research suggests that “. . . price level instability also contributed to
financial instability historically”.76 Yet other factors also contribute to financial
stability.77 In fact it has been acknowledged that “. . . financial imbalances can build
up even in an environment of stable prices”78 Moreover, even if a system stability
objective is provided for, given the nature of the subject-matter, this could hardly
amount to a precise or even quantified objective. This is highlighted by the
74See e.g. Art. 127(5) TFEU and Art. 3.3. of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, OJ 2008 C 115/230, according to which the
ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system.
75Brackets added and footnote omitted; Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-
off?, Speech presented at the conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the
Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003, Bank for International Settlements, available at http://
www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010). Issing does acknowledge the possibility of short-term
conflicts “in rare circumstances”.
76Bodo/Wheelock, Price Stability and Financial Stability: The Historical Record, Federal reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 1998, pp. 41 et seq. (60).
77See Trichet, Laudatio for Hans Tietmeyer, Speech held on 26 March 2010, available at http://
www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
78Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the confer-
ence on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003,
Bank for International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
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objectives in the legal bases of existing regulatory and supervisory agencies outside
central banks, where general references to preserving the stability of the financial
system or to maintaining market stability and at times even multiple objectives
linked to financial stability can be found.79 Judging a central bank’s performance
based on such broad objectives is difficult beyond generally noting the absence of
financial instability and/or insolvent financial institutions.80
What is more, calls for a greater role in monitoring system stability imply that
central banks can actually effectively detect systemic risks and act upon them with
the instruments currently at their disposal. In defence of placing these tasks with the
central bank it can be argued that “. . . synergies can be achieved by combining
information gained from prudential supervision and from the conduct of monetary
policy, the overall responsibility of the central bank for the stability of the system as
a whole and the independence position of central banks and technical expertise
existing therein, are all arguments in favour of vesting this task in the central
bank.”81 Applying a similar economy-of-scale argument the Larosie`re Report
emphasizes that “. . . the role of central banks which are by essence well placed to
observe the first signs of vulnerability of a bank is of crucial importance.”82 As
concerns the ability of a central bank to fulfill such a task, Issing notes that “The
uncertainty related to the identification of an asset price bubble is not fundamentally
different from the uncertainty surrounding other variables, in which the central
bank bases its policy decisions.”83 At the same time, against the background of the
housing bubble both Issing, as well as Posen question the ability of central banks to
effectively intervene once systemic risks have actually been detected. Posen
observes that the tightening of monetary policy in response to such developments
“in no way substitutes for directly dealing with the underlying financial problems”
while at the same time producing costs for the real economy.84 Yet, even if
79Exemplary in this regard are the five statutory objectives laid down for the UK Financial
Services Authority in the Financial Service and Markets Act 2000.
80With regard to the usefulness of such broad objectives for accountability purposes, see e.g.
H€upkes/Quintyn/Taylor, The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and
Practice, IMF Working Paper WP/05/51, 2005.
81Amtenbrink, Economic, Monetary and Social Policy, in: McDonnell/Kapteyn/Mortelmans/
Timmermans (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, (4th ed.)
2008, pp. 881 et seq. (972), with further references.
82The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (Larosie`re Report), chaired by J. de
Larosie`re, 25 February 2009, pp. 7 et seq.
83Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the confer-
ence on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003,
Bank for International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010).
84Posen, Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles, Peterson Institute for International
Economics Working Paper Series WP 06/1, January 2006, p. 11, who argues that “. . . the
connection between monetary conditions and the rise of bubbles is rather tenuous, and by raising
interest rates a central bank is unlikely to achieve what is needed — i.e., persuading investors that
the bubble is ill-founded and/or that they will not find some greater fool to sell to in time.”; see also
Issing, Monetary and Financial Stability: Is there a Trade-off?, Speech presented at the conference
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monetary policy may not provide the necessary instruments to intervene, this is not
to say that central banks are per se unsuitable for the job. In this regard much
depends on the legal arrangements governing micro-prudential supervision and, to
the extent that this task is placed (partially) outside the central bank, on the extent to
which the central bank cooperates with the competent financial regulatory and
(other) supervisory authorities. In case of a separation of tasks the role of the central
bank may be primarily that of monitoring and informing/advising the competent
agencies on systemic risks and how to address them.
Assigning prudential supervisory tasks to a central bank may not be entirely
unproblematic. Indeed, monetary policy and prudential supervision are somewhat
uneasy bedfellows.85 While it may be argued that as a lender of last resort central
banks should in principle be in a perfect position to monitor financial stability and
to judge whether financial institutions are actual insolvent or simply in need
of liquidity, Di Noia and Di Giorgio with reference to work by Goodhart and
Schoenmaker conclude that: “. . . this argument does not hold, in the sense that
the ‘revealed preferences’ of monetary authorities have been to ‘rescue banks
running into difficulties so long as there appeared to be any risk of a systemic
knock-on effect’”.86
Assigning multiple tasks to the central bank can give rise to perverse incentives
on parts of the central bank that may be tempted to (ab-) use monetary policy as a
tool to fulfil its role as supervisor, resulting in biased policy decisions.87 Supporting
this view, empirical evidence points to a positive correlation between the placement
of all banking supervisory tasks at the central banks and the rate and volatility of
inflation in countries.88 However, one should be careful not to conclude from this
on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle”, 28–29 March 2003, Bank for
International Settlements, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010), who raises
doubts as to the ability of central banks to detect such bubbles in real time.
85See generally on this issue Schoenmaker, Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and
Monetary Agencies, FMG Special papers No. 52, Financial Markets Group Research Centre,
1992; Di Noia/Di Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to
Different Institutions?, International Finance 3 (1999) 2, pp. 361 et seq. (368 et seq.); ECB, The
Role of Central Banks in Prudential Supervision, Position Paper, 2001, available at http://www.
ecb.int (last accessed 7 May 2010); in the European context see also Smits, The European Central
Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 310–327; Andenas/Hadjiemmanuel, Banking Supervision,
The Internal Market and European Monetary Union, in: Andenas et al. (eds.), European Economic
and Monetary Union: the Institutional Framework, 1997, pp. 371 et seq. (386–394); an instructive
overview of the arguments is provided in a position paper by the European Central Bank: The Role
of Central Banks, 2001, in particular p. 3–7.
86Di Noia/Di Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to
Different Institutions?, International Finance 3 (1999) 2, pp. 361 et seq. (368), with reference to
Goodhart/Schoenmaker, Should the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision be
separated?, Oxf. Econ. Pap. 47 (1995) 4, p. 539.
87Tuya/Zamalloa, Issues on Placing Banking Supervision in the Central Bank, in: Balino/Cottarelli
(eds.), Frameworks for Monetary Stability, 1994, pp. 663 et seq. (679).
88Di Noia/Di Giorgio, Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to
Different Institutions?, International Finance 3 (1999) 2, pp. 361 et seq. (376).
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that central banks should not at all be involved in prudential supervision. In fact
what is missing in debates on this topic is a clear differentiation between macro-
and micro-prudential supervisory tasks and thus, the task of ensuring the stability of
the financial system as a whole and the task of ensuring the safety of the banking
system (banking supervision). Indeed, the concerns about possible conflicts of
interests may be primarily linked to the latter function. It is at least not evident
why reinforced rules on the monitoring of financial stability and, where necessary, a
formal obligation to informing and advice competent regulatory and supervisory
agencies would be a major problem in this regard. Understood in such away, macro-
prudential supervision does not have to be at odds with the independent position of
a central bank or its primary monetary policy objective. Anything beyond such a
role however can create conflicts of interest and, in the case of a bad handling of a
crisis moreover result in reputational damage with effects also for monetary policy.
The vesting of extensive supervisory or even regulatory powers would also result in
a further accumulation of powers in what is already a major independent policy
maker – in many instances – effectively remote from the constitutional system of
checks and balances.
The integrated financial systems call for a global assessment of their stability.
Yet, any one central bank system arguably cannot make this assessment without
proper information. Thus, cooperation between central banks takes place through
an array of formal and informal international networks.89 This cooperation takes
place inter alia through the Financial Stability Board,90 the before mentioned
Central Bank Governance Forum91 and the Central Bank Governance Network.92
This also extents to global financial markets and to micro-prudential supervision.
The coordination and exchange of information is just as important as the establish-
ment of global standards and best practice. Once again the EU can serve as an
example for system providing for a such coordination, albeit being far from ideal
in this regard.
The role of the ECB in prudential supervision as described in the TFEU and the
Protocol on the ESCB and on the ECB is essentially limited to that of an advisor to
the Council, the European Commission and the competent authorities of the
Member States relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and to
the stability of the financial system as a whole.93 Financial market supervision is
89On central banks as network institutions, see Marcusson, The transnational governance network
of central bankers, in: Djelic/Sahlin-Anderson (eds.), Transnational Governance. Institutional
Dynamics of Regulation, 2006, pp. 180 et seq. (191 et seq.).
90Successor to the Financial Stability Forum. It brings together namely representatives from
national governments, central banks and supervisory agencies.
91Selected group of central bank governors that exchange views on the design and operation of
central banks.
92Forum bringing together central bank governors to exchange views on issues of central bank
governance with the Bank for International Settlements.
93Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 339–343, 353. In this
context Smits criticises the fact that the Protocol on certain provisions relating to the United
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effectively in the hands of the national competent authorities of the Member States
which in some, but certainly not all instances are the national central bank. Under
the current EU Lamfalussy framework no centralization, but rather a coordination
of supervisory tasks, namely through the Level 2 and Level 3 committees takes
place. The difficulties of coordinating supervisory efforts in such a decentralised
system have been extensively discussed in the relevant literature.94
The absence of a prudential supervision task of the ECB may be historically
explained by the reluctance of national governments (and indeed their central
banks) to vest also supervisory tasks upon a supranational independent monetary
policy authority, resulting not only in an accumulation of power, but also a further
loss of tasks for national central banks to perform.95 This may also explain why the
enabling clause of ex Art. 105(6) EC which allowed for the transfer to the ECB of
specific tasks concerning policies relating to the supervision of credit institutions
and other financial firms excluding insurance undertakings has never been acti-
vated. In fact the provision has been left unchanged by the Treaty of Lisbon which
does not vest any new supervisory powers in the ECB.96
In the wake of the global financial crisis the European Commission has revisited
the existing Union framework and made concrete proposals to reinforce financial
supervision.97 The several legislative proposals address both macro- as well as
micro-prudential supervision of the financial markets. From the outset it is note-
worthy that none of these proposals aim at outright placing macro- or micro-
prudential supervision at the ECB. Instead, on the micro-prudential side the
European Commission proposes the establishment of a European System of Finan-
cial Supervisors (ESFS), consisting of a network of national financial supervisors
working in cooperation with three new regulatory agencies, including a European
Banking Authority, a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and
a European Securities and Markets Authority.98 While placed outside the ECB,
Kingdom and the Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark for excluding this role of the
ECB. This may be particularly problematic in the case of the United Kingdom as the most
important European financial capital.
94E.g. Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation, 1996, with further references.
95See Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, 1997, pp. 334–338.
96Now Art. 127(6) TFEU.
97European Commission adopts legislative proposals to strengthen financial supervision in the EU,
Press release of 23 September 2009, IP/09/1347.
98Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European
Banking Authority, COM(2009) 501 final; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council establishing a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority,
COM(2009) 502 final; Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority, COM(2009) 503 final; see also Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directives
1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC,
2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European
Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority, COM(2009) 576 final.
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close institutional links primarily with the future European Banking Authority are
foreseen through the participation, albeit in a non-voting capacity, of an ECB
representative.
As far as macro-prudential supervision is concerned the European Commission
has proposed the establishment of a European System Risk Board (ESRB).99 The
ESRB would be established as an EU regulatory agency and thus be formally
placed outside the ECB. Nevertheless, the envisaged composition of the main
decision-making body highlights the close link to the ECB, the national central
banks and the national supervisory authorities all of which would make up the
majority of the members of the General Board of the ESRB.100 Moreover, it is
planned to situate the secretariat of the ESRB at the seat of the ECB, so that
synergies can emerge between these two bodies. The ESRB would be responsible
for the macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system “. . . in order to
prevent or mitigate systemic risks within the financial system, so as to avoid
episodes of widespread financial distress, contribute to a smooth functioning of
the Internal Market and ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to
economic growth.”101 For this purpose the ESRB would not only be charged with
identifying and prioritizing such risks, but in the case of the emergence of signifi-
cant risks to issue warnings and even recommendations for remedial action.102
Addressee of these warnings and recommendations could be the EU as a whole, the
proposed European regulatory agencies, Member States or national supervisory
authorities.103 Moreover, it is foreseen that the ESRB cooperates with international
institutions such as the IMF. All in all, namely the initiative to establish an ESRB
highlights the recognition in the EU of the need for more effective mechanisms to
prevent the emergence of a global financial crisis of the proportions which can
currently be witnessed.
Concluding Remarks
Ever since their emergence as sole issuer of currency, the role of central banks has
constantly evolved accommodating both for the development of (international)
trade and the understanding of the fundamentals of the economy. With the emer-
gence of regional economic cooperation namely in the second half of the twentieth
99Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro
prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board,
COM(2009) 499 final; Proposal for a Council Decision entrusting the European Central Bank with
specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, COM(2009) 500
final.





century and the gradual opening of domestic markets which increasingly has turned
into a global phenomenon, more than ever before in their history central banks find
themselves influenced by global trends and developments both in their institutional
set-up and their main monetary policy task.
More so than national regulators and policy makers the institutional character-
istics and main monetary policy objectives are decided by global financial markets
on whose trust central banks rely. This is facilitated by the drafting by international
standard setting organisations, such as the IMF, of guidelines and codes of best
practice. The lattor has resulted in a de facto synchronization of the main institutional
features and monetary tasks. Yet, in particular the unisono focus on price stability
has been criticised in the aftermath of the global financial crisis for having con-
tributed to a general failure by central banks to detect system risks.
In pursuing monetary policy in a global environment central banks may in fact
be much less independent in the conduct of monetary policy than their statutory
legal bases and – at times – regulators and policy makers suggest. This is not only
true but certainly also true in times of global financial crisis. Next to government
interventions, central banks have played a major role in adding liquidity to the
financial market and by guaranteeing (government) debts.104 Central banks could
be seen relaxing their monetary policies stands, whereby in some instances con-
ventional monetary policy reached its outer limits. Roberts predicts that as a result
of the role of central banks in the financial crisis “. . . it seems probable that
skepticism about technocratic governance and about the trustworthiness of markets
will encourage the reassertion of political influence in policy domains that were, in
the heyday of liberalization, the preserve of technocrat-guardians.”105 Translated to
the position of central banks this suggests that public and eventually political
pressure may grow to revisit the position of monetary policy authorities outside
government. However, it is unclear in exactly what ways the involvement of elected
politicians and government officials under the direct influence of the former would
be an improvement upon the current situation or would have prevented the crisis.
As far as monetary policy is concerned, in the absence of any evidence suggesting
104For an early overview of the role of central banks in dealing with the global financial crisis, see
Bank for International Settlements Committee on the Global Financial System, Central bank
operations in response to the financial turmoil, Report submitted by a Study Group established
by the Committee, July 2008, available at http://www.bis.org (last accessed 7 May 2010);
Papademos, How to deal with the global financial crisis and promote the economy’s recovery
and sustained growth, Speech held at the 7th European Business Summit organised by the
European Business Forum, 26 March 2009, available at http://www.ecb.int (last accessed 7 May
2010); Roth, Challenges for Central Banks during the Current Global Crisis, address at the
occasion of the Sixth Annual NBP-SNB Joint Seminar on “Challenges for Central Banks during
the Current Global Crisis”, 15 June 2009, available at http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/
sem_2009_06_14_speech/source (last accessed 7 May 2010).
105Roberts, The Failure of the Guardians: Central Banking Reform and the Financial Crisis,
Suffolk University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper 09-54, 21
December 2009, p. 25.
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that the theoretical and empirical foundation of the current institutional arrange-
ments, i.e. the negative correlation between central bank independence and inflation
and inflation variability, is obsolete changing the institutional position of central
banks would simply increase political influence without any major benefits.
All the same time, the financial crisis should be seen as an opportunity to
seriously re-evaluate the role of central banks as monetary policy authorities in a
global economy. In doing so it should be taken into consideration that, a simple
proliferation of central bank tasks does not necessarily make their role any more
effective or indeed straightforward.
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